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Juvenile incarceration in the United
States is, at ½rst glance, distinctly dif-
ferent from its adult counterpart. While
some juvenile facilities retain the iconic
aesthetic of adult incarceration1–orange
jumpsuits, large cellblocks, uniformed
guards, barbed wire, and similar heavy-
security measures–others have trappings
and atmospherics more reminiscent of
boarding schools, therapeutic commu-
nities, or small college campuses. These
compact, benign settings avoid the phys-
ical stigmata of institutional life and ac-
cord some autonomy of movement and
intimacy in relations with staff. They also
give primacy to developmentally appro-
priate and therapeutic interventions.
However, like its adult counterpart,
juvenile corrections, whether located in
a human warehouse or a therapeutic com-
munity, is designed mainly to control its
residents and restrict their personal free-
doms. Movement and association are in-
tensively regulated; outside contact with
family, friends, and intimate partners is
attenuated and used as an incentive for
good behavior; access to media and cul-
ture is restricted; privacy is nonexistent;
and choice of clothing, language, and
other modes of personal expression is
off-limits. Whatever developmental im-
portance these forms of self-expression
and self-determination may have for ad-
olescents, it is sacri½ced to the primary
goals of security, control, discipline, and
punishment. Most important, at either
end of the continuum of institutional
climate, the options of solitary con½ne-
ment, physical restraint, or other forms of
extreme deprivation exist to control the
de½ant and unruly or to punish wrong-
doing. Accordingly, the naming conven-
tions for these juvenile facilities are de-
ceptive: these are not “training schools”
or “centers” or any other kind of school
or academy, nor are they “homes.” These
are correctional facilities whose primary
purpose is to punish. 
One would expect such institutions to
be reserved for those who are most de-
serving of punishment or those who pose
a nontrivial risk to public safety. But un-
der the enduring doctrine of parens patri-
ae,2 we incarcerate children for a mixed
bag of rationales, ones that do not always
comport with the punitive dimensions
of juvenile incarceration. Parens patriae
obligates the court to act beyond the
need simply to protect children from the
harms of noxious social circumstances
or to avail them of developmental and
material supports that their families have
failed to provide. The doctrine allows–
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even mandates–juvenile courts to pro-
tect children from themselves: from their
associations with antisocial peers, from
poor decision-making with respect to
crime, and from harms to their physical
and mental health to which they expose
themselves.3 As a result, we incarcerate
children because their homes are too dan-
gerous or criminogenic; because they are
both delinquent and mentally ill or ad-
dicted to intoxicants and there are no
other appropriate placements; because
they need therapies that are unavailable
elsewhere, even though they pose no se-
curity risks; because they are homeless;
because they are sexually active at young
ages; or because we think they may com-
mit some crime in the near future.4
The resulting landscape of juvenile
incarceration has been, not surprisingly,
complex and shifting since the 1970s, the
decade when adult incarceration trends
began their robust increase. Since that
time, juvenile incarceration, and juvenile
justice itself, has been situated in a space
bounded by the transcendent nineteenth-
century child-saving movement, the pro-
cedural rights movement of the 1960s,
and the raw emotional politics of violent
crime and punishment in the past three
decades. Accordingly, we see contradic-
tions everywhere in this terrain. Growth
in the incarcerated population since the
1970s has been restrained, even in the
face of a youth violence epidemic,5 and
even as rhetoric has grown harsher and
statutes have been revised to express the
language of retribution and incapacita-
tion.6 States, for the most part, have ac-
knowledged the advantages of small facil-
ities to advance the core rehabilitative
and therapeutic projects that informed
the creation of separate institutions for
juveniles nearly two centuries ago, even
if they have not necessarily acted on those
ideas and instincts.7 At the same time, the
conditions in juvenile corrections often
remain harsh, a sign of both cynicism
about rehabilitation and institutional
self-interest, as well as neglect.8 States
have quickened the pace of expulsions of
juvenile offenders to the criminal courts
and prisons as a way to “get tough,”9
even as they refuse to lower the age of
majority and fundamentally alter eligi-
bility for the protections of juvenile in-
stitutions. Racial disparities remain du-
rable and defy explicit legislative and
policy efforts to reduce them.
These contradictions and puzzles
inform this essay on juvenile incarcera-
tion. The patterns of growth in juvenile
corrections suggest ambivalence about
the reform and rehabilitation of juvenile
offenders, notions that have been bat-
tered by three successive waves of high
crime over the past thirty years. On the
one hand, courts and legislatures want to
be tough; on the other hand, there are
strong preservationist instincts at play
that have muted the growth in incarcera-
tion of minors. “Getting tough” on juve-
nile offenders has thus been assigned to
the criminal courts and adult correctional
institutions. But there are signs of ambiv-
alence there, with relatively short sen-
tences and a responsiveness to crime rates
in new admissions (flow) and total pop-
ulation (stock) that is the opposite of
what we see for adults. States have dem-
onstrated their ambivalence by avoiding
change to the age of majority, the last re-
sort in increasing punitiveness for juve-
niles. Such a step would be a poison pill
for the doctrine of parens patriae in which
juvenile corrections is steeped. Racial dis-
parity pervades juvenile incarceration,
yet Congress attempted remedial steps
never contemplated for adults, by engag-
ing states in a collaborative project to re-
duce racial inequalities in juvenile deten-
tion and corrections. What this all adds
up to is an institutional landscape that
at once fears child criminals and wants






to punish them harshly, but at the same
time adheres to the transcendent philos-
ophy of child-saving. 
Beginning in the 1970s, the traditional
discretion of juvenile court judges to
place youths in correctional con½nement
was contested, as was the discretion of
corrections of½cials to determine how
long youths would remain in placement.
On balance, discretion lost. The introduc-
tion of mandatory minimum sentences
for juveniles in New York and elsewhere
in the 1970s was followed in subsequent
decades by new laws mandating waiver
to adult court and mandatory placement
in a secure facility.10 In this hardening
political atmosphere, fueled by rising
juvenile arrest rates and a punitive drift
toward more formal processing and less
diversion, one might have predicted rap-
id and persistent growth in the rate of ju-
venile imprisonment starting in the 1970s.
By the 1990s, when a moral panic over a
new species of juvenile offenders known
as “superpredators”11 and the spread of
violent youth gangs further animated leg-
islatures to pass tougher sentencing laws
for juveniles,12 the conditions seemed
ripe for the juvenile court to follow a tra-
jectory of incarceration growth similar
to the rise in adult rates.
But it didn’t happen, at least not in ju-
venile corrections. Growth in juvenile
incarceration in both public and private
facilities was only a fraction of the growth
in adult incarceration. Juvenile incarcer-
ation–both in short-term detention and
longer-term correctional placements–
rose from 73,023 youths in public institu-
tions and private residential facilities in
1977 to 95,818 in 1992, the year preceding
the modern peak in juvenile arrests for
felony crimes.13 Juvenile incarceration
peaked in 2000 at 108,802, a rate of 356
per 100,000 youths ages ten to seventeen.
The placement rate declined by more
than 20 percent by 2008, to approximate-
ly 81,000 children living in either state-
operated facilities or privately operated
group homes, or 263 youths per 100,000
persons ages ten to seventeen.14 This 
juvenile placement rate today pales in
comparison to the adult incarceration
rate of 762.15
Figure 1 shows that placements in pub-
lic facilities accounted for most of the
rise and fall in juvenile incarceration, and
that these were somewhat responsive to
the rise and subsequent fall in juvenile
arrests. Between 1997 and 2008, juvenile
arrests declined by 33 percent, while the
overall correctional placement of youths
declined by 26 percent.16 Placement in
private facilities rose more slowly and
was fairly stable over time. 
About 70 percent were committed fol-
lowing an adjudication of delinquency,
and 28 percent were detained prior to the
resolution of their case.17 They were in-
carcerated on a variety of offenses, with
the greatest number placed for person
offenses (34 percent) followed by prop-
erty offenses (25 percent). Drug offenses
accounted for 9 percent of the incarcer-
ated population, but more were placed
for “public order” offenses such as alco-
hol or disorderly conduct (11 percent)
than were placed for drugs. As with their
adult counterparts, many (16 percent)
were placed for technical violations of
probation or juvenile parole. One in
twenty was placed for any of several
“status offenses”: social behaviors that
do not violate any criminal code but that
capture the court’s attention due to the
risk of danger to the child’s well-being.18
The area that grew most, however, was
the number of juveniles below age eigh-
teen in state prisons. The pattern in Fig-
ure 2 shows a rise in the number of per-
sons below age eighteen incarcerated in
state prisons from 1985 to 2004, as well
as new admissions for that same group.







The patterns reflect broader trends in 
juvenile crime and arrest, especially the
spike in juvenile violence from 1987 to
1996. The census population of minors in
prison peaked at 5,400 in 1996 and de-
clined by nearly half, to 2,477, in 2004.19
The population remained stable through
2007, when 2,283 youths were in state
prisons or privately operated correctional
facilities programmed for adults.20
Two trends in Figure 2 are notable and
suggest conflicting instincts. 
One is the rapid growth in the num-
ber of youths sentenced as adults. This
trend is responsive to crime trends and
also reflects a growing punitiveness to-
ward youth crime that was structured 
into sentencing statutes. (The “get tough”
trend for juveniles is discussed later in
this essay.) But the sentences seem to be
attenuated, suggesting that the legisla-
tures were tempered in setting tariffs for
minors. Figure 2 shows that the number
of new admissions of minors to adult
prisons tracks the trend for the one-day
census. There is no buildup of “stock”
for this population, unlike the steady
growth for adults. 
The similar trend lines for the popula-
tion census and the new admissions sug-
gest that the sentences for this population
were shorter and releases were quicker,
reflecting a de facto youth discount that
many states structure into sentencing
statutes under “youthful offender” or
“juvenile offender” provisions.21 The re-
sponsiveness in the decline of juveniles
in adult prisons beginning in 2000 shows
a sensitivity to declining crime rates that
is not evident for the adult population.
Nevertheless, even short-term expo-
sure for youths to adult prisons has risks
for youths and for public safety. To the
extent that legislators ignored these risks,
the wholesale transfer of minors to the
criminal courts was a reckless experiment.
A robust body of research shows that re-
cidivism rates are in fact higher for youths






Source: Melissa Sickmund et al., Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement (National Center
for Juvenile Justice, 2008), http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp; Steven D. Levitt, “Juvenile Crime and
Punishment,” Journal of Political Economy 106 (1998): 1156–1185.
Figure 1
Juvenile Placements in Public and Private Facilities and Juvenile Arrests for Violence, 1977–2006
sentenced as adults, after controlling for
relevant offender and offense character-
istics.22 There appears to be no marginal
deterrent effect from incarcerating mi-
nors as adults, which was a cornerstone
of youth policy in the 1990s. One explana-
tion for the elevated recidivism rates may
be the effects of adolescents’ exposure to
prison life and adult convicts. While like-
ly to be separated physically from older
inmates, the institutional climate on the
youth side may hardly differ from other
blocks in the prison: the separation may
be one of degree rather than kind. Indeed,
it may even worsen the chaos and vio-
lence of correctional con½nement by con-
centrating youths who are at their peak
ages of criminality and diminished self-
control.23 Only a few studies have com-
pared the correctional experiences of
youths in prisons and juvenile incarcera-
tion, but all agree that placing youths in
prisons comes at a cost: they are less like-
ly to receive education and other essential
services, they are more likely to be vic-
tims of physical violence, and they mani-
fest a variety of psychological symptoms.24
The residual consequences of adoles-
cents’ exposure to violence in adult pris-
ons are uncertain. But as a matter of prin-
ciple, it is not easy to reconcile this par-
ticular harm with the diminished blame-
worthiness and culpability of adolescents.
Social and behavioral science informed
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on
youth crime and punishment,25 but crim-
inal court sentencing policies more gen-
erally are hostile to the new cognitive
science of diminished culpability of ad-
olescents.26 Potentially dis½guring pun-
ishments seem disproportionate, if not
cynical, in the context of this new evi-
dence about the blameworthiness of ad-
olescents, especially if criminal justice
goals are not well served by transfer and
subsequent incarceration.27






Source: Howard Snyder and Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Of½ce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006), 236–238,
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006.
Figure 2
Inmates under Eighteen in State Prisons, 1985–2004
There are puzzles and contradictions
behind these trends. While American
lawmakers exponentially expanded pris-
on capacities for adults starting in the
1980s, there was–with rare exceptions–
no expansion of the capacities to incar-
cerate minors. This was one of two non-
events in modern juvenile justice that il-
lustrate the dissonance in thinking about
responses to serious youth crime. Figure 1
shows that the rate of increase in juvenile
con½nement was a fraction of the rate of
increase in juvenile arrests; as crime de-
clined, juvenile courts responded quick-
ly by decelerating the rate of placements.
Yet in the juvenile system, even as
states made the choice not to build new
juvenile space and not to dramatically
increase youth con½nement, every state
toughened its juvenile delinquency codes
rhetorically to deemphasize rehabilita-
tion and focus on punishment, retribu-
tion, and incapacitation.28 Thus, “get-
ting tough” in the juvenile system was
not an institutional project, but a statu-
tory one. Programming was largely un-
affected, as the locus of effects of these
new measures was on court decisions.
The changes took several forms, but all
had the combined effect of marginally
increasing the likelihood of juvenile cor-
rectional con½nement or lengthening the
time spent in placement.
The harder work of “getting tough”
was outsourced to the criminal justice
system, with states more often than not
using “regular” criminal law for juveniles.
Statutes were amended to ease and ex-
pand the number of youths transferred
to the criminal courts for sentencing as
an adult.29 The results are evident in
Figure 2, as the number of youths con-
½ned in adult prisons rose (and fell)
sharply. The “get tough” measures took
several forms. Between 1990 and 1997,
every state in America modi½ed both 
its juvenile and criminal codes to expand
the number of youths eligible for transfer
to the criminal courts.30 In 1995 alone,
nineteen states amended their criminal
codes to facilitate the discretionary trans-
fer of delinquents to the criminal court or
the wholesale exclusion of youths from
the juvenile court.31 Each strategy was
designed to increase punishment in num-
bers and in severity. Several states adopt-
ed mandatory minimum sentences for
youths committed to state juvenile cor-
rections authorities. Others adopted sen-
tencing guidelines that ½xed sentences
in the juvenile system based on a grid of
offense, offender characteristics, and vic-
tim characteristics. Still other states ex-
panded eligibility for sentencing minors
to life without parole, or death in prison,
and made those sentences automatic up-
on conviction for enumerated crimes.32
Prior to the 2010 U.S. Supreme Court rul-
ing in Graham v. Florida that banned life-
without-parole sentences for juveniles
who did not commit murder,33 approxi-
mately 2,484 youths were serving such
sentences in 2008, many as young as
thirteen, and many others for crimes
other than murder or manslaughter.34
But these developments point to the
second non-event in the toughening of
juvenile justice and juvenile incarcera-
tion. Certainly, a state that truly wanted
to crack down on juveniles and make in-
carceration harsher could simply have
lowered its age of major ity and sent all
its older juvenile offenders to adult pris-
ons. Only two did so: Wisconsin and
New Hampshire lowered the age of ma-
jority from seventeen to sixteen in the
1990s.35 In fact, one state, Connecticut,
has begun a process to incrementally
raise its age of majority from sixteen to
eighteen.36 New York and North Carolina
maintain the age of majority at sixteen; in
most states, it is still eighteen.
Stopping short of the more obvious
and expedient step of lowering the age






of majority, states have instead used an
incremental and piecemeal legislative
strategy to criminalize delin quency and
thereby allow them to sentence adoles-
cents to adult punishment for crimes
committed as minors. But despite the
wave of transfer legislation, the current
statutory landscape is an elaborate game
of chutes and ladders, with some youths
automatically transferred to the criminal
courts only to be “reverse waived” back
to the juvenile courts. As a result, many
adolescent offenders (though no one
knows exactly how many) escape the
reach of the criminal law and its harsh-
er punish ments. Nevertheless, a large
number are removed from the juvenile
to the criminal courts by statutory exclu-
sion, judicial discretion, or the adminis-
trative practices and preferences of pros-
ecutors.37
Viewed in this way, legislators appear
ambivalent, refusing to abandon com-
pletely the principles of juvenile justice,
yet seeking to divide delinquents into two
categories: those worthy of the remedial
and therapeutic interventions of the juve-
nile court and those who should be aban-
doned to the punitive regime of criminal
justice in the name of retribution and
public safety. The complexity of state
laws, the piecemeal character of the stat-
utory landscape, and the fact that most
states have overlapping transfer mecha-
nisms suggest a philosophical duality.
The punitive and child-saver instincts
for youth crime coexist uneasily in the
cur rent statutory environment, forcing 
a binary choice between criminal and
juvenile court jurisdiction–a choice 
that is not well suited to reconcile these
tensions.38
On balance, the business of getting
tough on juvenile offenders was assigned
to the criminal justice system, while the
juvenile system remained relatively small
and still wrapped, however thinly, in its
rehabilitative and child-saver clothing.
Why did juvenile corrections expand so
little during a time of unprecedented and
unrestrained growth in adult corrections?
And why did it transform from warehous-
ing to embracing smaller, more therapeu-
tically grounded facilities?39 The num-
bers reveal the tension between two fea-
tures of American jurisprudence sur-
rounding juvenile offenders. We believe
deeply in child-saving, yet we are quick
to expose violent children to the harshest
punishments in service to the same pu-
nitive instincts that drive mass incarcer-
ation of adults. But even there, we pull
our punches. We pull back from the brink
of fully embracing punitiveness toward
juveniles, reserving it instead for adults.
Not only is the philosophy of child-saving
an important normative modi½er of these
instincts, it is also deeply embedded in
the institutions of juvenile justice and
juvenile corrections.
One episode illustrates the connections
between the visceral push for punitive-
ness and political culture. In 1996, former
U.S. Secretary of Education William Ben-
nett and two colleagues published Body
Count.40 The book offered a “moral pov-
erty” theory of youth crime, rejecting
social theories of juvenile crime causa-
tion that focused on economic poverty,
discrimination, family dysfunction, or
savage levels of inequality. Instead, for
Bennett and his coauthors, it was moral
poverty that characterized a coming wave
of “superpredators” who would commit
extremely violent crimes and be immune
to rehabilitative interventions. They char-
acterized this new breed of young offend-
ers as impulsive and remorseless, fearing
not “the stigma of arrest, the pains of im-
prisonment, [or] the pangs of conscience.”
These (predicted) young criminals were
portrayed nearly as a separate species.
The authors’ predictions were based on






data that were compiled through 1993,
the peak year of juvenile crime and vio-
lence in the United States.41 Their predic-
tions turned out to be horribly wrong.42
But the damage was done. The book
supplied strong and scary rhetoric to fuel
the legislative panic that, in general, pro-
duced a wave of get-tough legislation
across the country. So strong and persua-
sive was this rhetoric that it led one state
(Pennsylvania) to build a youth prison 
in anticipation of a surge of superpred-
ators, not a juvenile center that empha-
sized rehabilitation and other services.
The State Correctional Institute at Pine
Grove opened in 2000, its plan and de-
sign based on population projections
from the superpredator era and with 
that pro½le of the young offender in
mind. At its opening, the prison housed
178 young offenders, well below its ca-
pacity of 1,000.43 By that time, youth
crime had fallen in Pennsylvania, and
the number of youths below eighteen 
in adult prisons had fallen to sixty-six. 
To ½ll this new youth prison, the state
moved young offenders from some tradi-
tional correctional settings to Pine Grove,
and the state’s juvenile court judges made
good use of the new placement option.
Pine Grove today is well occupied, hous-
ing approximately one thousand inmates
below the age of twenty-one. Built to
house the expected wave of superpreda-
tors, today it is ½lled with a heterogeneous
group of adolescent offenders whose pro-
½les are more typical of the variety of
youth crimes that characterize contem-
porary youth dockets. 
The character of juvenile incarceration
has also changed dramatically over three
decades. Beginning in the 1970s, as adult
correctional populations surged, large
juvenile corrections facilities in several
states were replaced by smaller facilities
housing fewer than thirty children per
center, sometimes in community-based
residential programs but other times in
“campuses” that included cluster or resi-
dential “pods.”44 Jerome Miller, architect
of the Massachusetts reforms, showed
that scandals involving staff abuse of
youth residents, as well as youth suicides
and uncontrolled violence, often sparked
these changes. Massachusetts, Pennsyl-
vania, Utah, and Florida, among others,
moved from large, toxic warehouses to
these smaller, disaggregated dormitory-
like units.45 In effect, the capacities of
these systems were capped, and any ex-
pansion required the participation of
the private sector.46
Yet noxious conditions still prevail in
many juvenile corrections facilities and
systems, and litigation is not uncommon.
In Galloway v. Texas,47 for example, plain-
tiff Galloway was placed in detention at
fourteen and held until he reached nine-
teen, the maximum age of juvenile juris-
diction, based on unreviewable adminis-
trative decisions by facility staff. The trial
record showed that Galloway and many
others had been physically and sexually
abused, subjected to physical punish-
ment, abused by other inmates (abuse
that was often sanctioned by staff ), and
denied access to counsel. Essential ser-
vices–medical care, education, psychi-
atric treatment–were found to be sub-
standard. More than ½ve hundred chil-
dren were released from unlawful juve-
nile corrections con½nement in Texas 
as a result of the ruling. 
Conditions in New York State juvenile
corrections facilities were investigated
recently by the Civil Rights Division of
the U.S. Department of Justice, which
reported similar problems. As a result,
there is now federal oversight of four of
the state’s largest youth corrections fa-
cilities.48 And in California, the state
was ordered back to court for failure to
comply with the terms of a consent de-






cree that committed the juvenile correc-
tions authority, the Division of Juvenile
Justice of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (formerly
the Youth Authority), to conform to pro-
fessional and legal standards for essen-
tial services and the safety of its wards.49
These cases are not isolated instances;
litigation to remedy violent, abusive, and
other substandard conditions in juvenile
incarceration and detention has been re-
peated across the country for decades.
Structurally, federal civil rights litiga-
tion in these instances is constrained in
its force and reach by the Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act (plra).50 In Galloway,
for instance, relief was limited by the
plra’s constraints on which conditions
can be litigated, its short paths to termi-
nation of existing remedial decrees, and
its restrictions on the authority of feder-
al judges to order future remedies. The
plra applies fully to juvenile corrections
and detention facilities: Congress classi-
½ed juvenile facilities as “prisons” and
their occupants “prisoners.” In doing so,
it erected tall and robust barriers to chil-
dren’s assertion of their rights: in effect,
they face the same hurdles that adult
prisoners do. For children, the problem
is compounded because they cannot sue
in their own name, and also by the fact
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17
relegates the question of capacity and
overcrowding to state law. Under these
conditions, children cannot get to court
without a guardian, and most lack the
social capital and experience to activate
those resources. Furthermore, there sim-
ply are no local enforcement mechanisms
to ensure compliance with federal litiga-
tion. It is up to local district attorneys to
enforce the law when abuses are revealed.
The political complications are obvious.
Again, we see very different visions of
juvenile justice and incarceration. One is
represented by the development of new
models and institutional designs for the
rehabilitation of serious juvenile offend-
ers. This vision includes attention not
just to basics such as education, but to
new models for working with children
and their families to sustain therapeutic
successes beyond the time of correction-
al con½nement.51 The other vision is
typi½ed by institutions that are violent,
abusive, and indifferent to the essential
developmental interventions for adoles-
cent offenders. Attorney and legal schol-
ar Michael Tigar characterizes these as
places where juvenile punishment has
taken on the distorted values of criminal
law and correctional institutions, where
intervention is secondary to security and
punishment, and where indifference tol-
erates abuse and violence.52 In these
places, services are thin and differ little
from ordinary jails, only that the resi-
dents are younger, smaller, and more eas-
ily exploited. Between these poles are the
institutions that struggle to mount effec-
tive programs with a population of dif-
½cult children who pose security as well
as therapeutic challenges.
Racial disparities in juvenile detention
and incarceration closely resemble racial
disparities in the imprisonment and jail-
ing of adults. Considering the negative
consequences of incarceration on crime
and social well-being, these disparities
unfortunately may multiply the effects
of other forms of disadvantage and may
become an endogenous form of inequal-
ity that is dif½cult to escape. Social scien-
tists call this a “poverty trap.”53
In the 2006 census of juveniles in resi-
dential placement, 40.2 percent of resi-
dents were African American and 20.5
percent were Hispanic, compared to 35
percent white.54 These disparities were
greater for person crimes and drug of-
fenses (44 percent were African Ameri-
can in each category) and less for techni-






cal violations (37 percent were African
American) and status offenses (33 per-
cent were African American). In fact, 50
percent of incarcerated status offenders
counted in the 2006 juvenile corrections
census were white. 
Racial disparities are far worse for pre-
trial detention, compared to those who
are incarcerated following a ½nding of
delinquency. Nearly half (48 percent) of
those detained for person crimes, 45 per-
cent detained on drug offenses, and 46
percent detained for public order offenses
were African Americans, compared to
less than 30 percent whites in each of
these categories.55 (Public order offenses
include weapons offenses as well as pub-
lic drinking and a range of low level–and
high police-discretion–misdemeanor of-
fenses.) 
These disparities are not well explained
by differences in crime rates.56 Studies
using several designs and analytic strate-
gies conclude that racial disparities in the
decision to detain and incarcerate youths
are influenced by race and risk factors
such as family structure that are correlated
with race more than criminal behavior.57
Other research implicates fundamental
cognitive and unconscious processes in
the production of disparities. Two stud-
ies based on observations of decisions by
police or probation of½cers illustrate the
role of race in the attribution of blame-
worthiness, risk of future crime, and rec-
ommendations for punishment. Sociolo-
gists George Bridges and Sara Steen, ana-
lyzing narratives of presentence reports
by probation of½cers in three counties in
Washington State, showed that probation
of½cers were more likely to attribute the
causes of crime for African American
youths to internal character and person-
ality attributes rather than external fac-
tors such as family, neighborhood, or
school. These internal attributions led
to conclusions about “responsibility,”
whereas external attributions tended to
reduce culpability by externalizing the or-
igins of crime (and its severity) for white
youths to the defendant’s social surround-
ings. These internal attributions in turn
led to racially disparate attributions of
risk of future offending and harsher sen-
tencing recommendations. Bridges and
Steen also noted that a criminal history
tends to multiply these effects. 
Educational psychologist Sandra
Graham and organizational behavior
scholar Brian Lowery produced similar
results using an experimental paradigm
in which police and probation of½cers
made judgments about culpability and
predictions of future crime following
exposure to race-speci½c or race-neutral
subliminal primes. Compared to of½cers
given a race-neutral prime, police and
probation of½cers given race-speci½c
primes rated a hypothetical offender
with more negative traits such as hostil-
ity and immaturity, attributed greater
culpability, had higher expectations of
recidivism, and endorsed harsher pun-
ishment. These results were robust to
controls for consciously expressed be-
liefs about African Americans. 
Studies based on case-processing data
also reach the same conclusions, as does
a research summary prepared for the De-
partment of Justice. This is true both in
criminal court and for juveniles who are
transferred to criminal court.58
The policy studies raise two dif½cult
questions. First, are the effects of dispa-
rate outcomes at early stages predictive
of outcomes–including the decision to
detain or incarcerate a young offender–
at later stages? Researchers disagree on
this point. Some suggest that disadvan-
tage at early decision points, such as the
decision to detain or to treat a case for-
mally instead of using a diversionary al-
ternative, at a minimum carries forward
and perhaps multiplies across decision






points. Others suggest that disparities at
each stage are unique to decisions at that
stage, net of ½ltering at each stage. In ei-
ther case, there is a unique additive com-
ponent for race that seems to produce
disparate outcomes overall, including
correctional placements.59
Second, and more fundamentally, does
the combined evidence from experimen-
tal and observational studies suggest that
racial bias is present in the juvenile justice
system with suf½cient salience to produce
disparities? It is always dif½cult to iden-
tify and control for all the counterfactuals
that would have to be defeated in order
to make such a claim. At the least, these
would include a set of institutional pre-
ferences and norms that are dif½cult to
measure and that are likely to vary widely
across locales. But what is important to
note is that the two most likely counter-
factuals–differences in criminal behav-
ior and differences in social risk indicia
–are not signi½cant producers of racial
disparities. 
Based on the research of Graham and
Lowery, conscious bias is not a signi½cant
producer of racial disparity either, but
subconscious bias may be, as well as ra-
cial differences in punitiveness and racial
stereotypes. Sociologist Lawrence Bobo
and Victor Thompson, for example, sum-
marize public opinion research to show
that negative racial stereotypes, antiblack
affect, and collective racial resentments
translate into increased punitiveness.60
We have no reason to believe that this
might not apply to probation workers
and police of½cers who produce a supply
of cases for the juvenile court. Research
on “colorism” shows that both African
Americans and white Americans associ-
ate skin tone with criminality and de-
served punishment.61 In a series of tests
on implicit bias, every population group
except African Americans unconsciously
associates “African American” with crime
or danger and reacts accordingly.62 Tests
include recognition of African American
faces in crime situations (including pos-
session of weapons)63 and whether to
shoot unarmed suspects when they are
shown holding ambiguous objects other
than guns.64 Con½rming what Bridges
and Steen and Graham and Lowery re-
ported, the Plant and Peruche tests giv-
en to police of½cers produced the same
results.
The impacts of racially disparate deci-
sions in juvenile detention and incarcer-
ation go beyond the loss of liberty and
exposure to socially and emotionally dis-
½guring punishments. Juvenile incarcer-
ation attenuates the accumulation of so-
cial capital to access job networks and
other supports; instead–at a develop-
mentally sensitive and strategic period
of transition from adolescence to adult-
hood–it leads to the accrual of criminal
capital that sustains delinquency beyond
the time of placement.65 In this way, in-
carceration compounds social and racial
disadvantage to sustain inequalities over
the life course,66 with crime itself only a
partial explanation of the sources of that
disadvantage. For minors, developmen-
tal trajectories following incarceration
suggest that crime is less a factor than
cascading social disadvantage. Studies 
of criminality over the life course show
the unique and lasting disadvantage that
accrues from an early incarceration ex-
perience, no matter the behavior that led
to the period of incarceration.67 Incarcer-
ation at a young age not only increases
the risk of future incarceration, it mort-
gages the long-term prospects of young
males for marriage, employment, and
social stability over a lifetime. Even a
short spell in detention adversely influ-
ences the outcomes of cases once they get
to court, tipping the odds toward harsh-
er punishment instead of diversion or
probation.68 Young offenders who are






detained in jails or group homes while
their cases work their way through court
are more likely to be placed in a correc-
tional institution at the conclusion of the
case than those who return home or to
school as their cases are resolved. Early
correctional placement has a multiplier
effect on the prospects of future impris-
onment. To the extent that incarcera-
tion effects carry forward, we might ask
whether the social harms of incarcera-
tion on young people are simply those 
of their parents revisited on them–and
whether the harms to them will be revis-
ited on their children.69
In the political economy of incarcera-
tion, it is remarkable that either a legisla-
tive or executive branch would acknowl-
edge racial disparity much less seek rem-
edies to it. Thus, the efforts of the Depart-
ment of Justice and Congress to reduce
racial disparities in juvenile con½nement
through public interventions are coura-
geous and noteworthy. Because this step
was reserved for minors, it again signals
the special place child-saving holds as a
normative imperative and policy prefer-
ence in the culture of crime and punish-
ment.
To regulate public sector practices that
might lead to racial disparities, Congress
took a rare step in 1992, passing legisla-
tion requiring states that receive feder-
al juvenile-justice funds to implement
strategies to reduce disparities (where
those disparities exist) in the con½ne-
ment rates of minority juveniles. This
provision, known as the disproportion-
ate minority contact statute (dmc),70
seems modest in comparison to Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act: it applies
only to state-run juvenile justice pro-
grams receiving federal funds. Failure 
to comply can cost an agency at least 25
percent of its federal juvenile-justice
support.
Legal scholar Olatunde Johnson71 de-
scribes the dmc provision as unique in
several ways. First, it calls on public ac-
tors to reduce disparities no matter what
the cause, no matter whether intentional
or reflective of the types of passive dis-
crimination that characterize everyday
institutional business, even if these prac-
tices advance the criminal justice inter-
ests of the public agency. Action requires
only that there be a showing that the agen-
cy was complicit in producing disparity.
Second, the statute requires states to
gather analytic data to diagnose the insti-
tutional practices or public policies that
produce racial disparities, and to identify
appropriate steps to change those prac-
tices. In effect, the statute requires states
to look beyond “invidious bias” to discov-
er and remedy the sources of disparity.
States were tasked with submitting inter-
vention plans that reflected their analysis
of the sources of disparity, developing in-
terventions, and assessing the success of
their efforts. In 2002, Congress broadened
the mandate of dmc to look not just at
con½nement, but also at any type of con-
tact. This expansion recognized the role
that police and early-stage juvenile justice
decisions play in producing disparities. 
There are stories of both success and
failure under dmc. Johnson notes that
when dmc succeeds, it is because it lever-
aged the power of internal and external
local advocates to design measures to re-
duce disparity. The data analytic com-
ponent has also produced informational
transparency that levels the playing ½eld
between advocates and government of½-
cials. It is a process of what legal scholar
Heather Gerken calls “federalism all the
way down,” in part localizing solutions
and also developing local expertise that
competes with interior institutional log-
ic and norms.72
Johnson suggests that failures under
dmc reflect the weakness of local en-






forcement and ambivalence, if not resist-
ance, that are, in turn, reflections of the
local political structure. It requires inter-
nal change agents within agencies as well
as external agents, especially advocacy
groups. Localities could be exposed to
lawsuits based on the information devel-
oped through the data analytic process,
creating an untenable political tension. A
set of political scripts that invokes public
safety concerns in the face of systemic re-
form efforts is a blunt instrument to neu-
tralize reform.73 Thus, the recurring re-
newal of political support–based on re-
search–is essential to sustain the reform.
And this, as Johnson points out, is hardly
a sure bet, since radically disparate treat-
ment is not a strong motivation to expend
political capital. The counterargument is
that revelations of the connection be-
tween public policy and racially disparate
treatment leading to incarceration make
a strong normative argument that politi-
cal actors ignore at their own risk. Per-
haps the current low-crime era affords a
moment to push ahead with this project.
The opposing, if not contradictory,
trends in the philosophy and practice of
juvenile incarceration can be observed
empirically in states’ variations in the
practice and reach of juvenile incarcera-
tion. At the peak of juvenile incarceration,
states varied in their incarceration popu-
lations from a low of 70 per 100,000 ju-
veniles in Vermont to a high of 583 in
Louisiana.74 Explanations for variation
are themselves varied: from racial threat
and symbolic threats to public order, to
violent crime rates, to loose couplings
between juvenile and adult correctional
systems, to variation in the political trac-
tion of “get tough” policies.75 These di-
verse explanations matter because they
speak to different strains in the political
culture of crime and punishment–in
particular about whether juvenile crime
and punishment is itself a symbolic or
substantive concern. 
Symbolic threats are sociologically
connected to structural conditions, in-
cluding minority threat, inequality, and
public manifestations of crime such as
gangs. When professor of law Jonathan
Simon speaks about “governing through
crime,” he portrays a discourse and sub-
sequent political mobilization built on
crime fears that translate into legislative
action. These threats create emotions
beyond the facts of crime itself by im-
parting social meaning to crime: gang
violence signals the rise of an enemy, for
example, and the trifecta of gangs, guns,
and drugs signals a very particular and ur-
gent threat to social order. Even property
crime can translate into a threat through
its spurious connection to violent crime.
If crime itself is racially skewed, whether
among juveniles or adults, then discon-
necting symbolic threats from the real
fears of crime becomes more dif½cult.
Sorting out these threats is a dif½cult
empirical task. An analysis by criminol-
ogist Daniel Mears of state variation in
juvenile incarceration suggests that it is
not just the threat of violent crime that
explains differences between states, but
a combination of adult crime rates, adult
incarceration rates, and juvenile property
crime rates. What happened to the super-
predator discourse about juvenile vio-
lence? Why was it not a more powerful
predictor of juvenile incarceration?
Quite likely, the discourse was already
incorporated into other “get tough”
measures, including adult incarceration
rates and policies, as well as adult crime.
State variation may also conceal inter-
nal systemic and political factors that
bear on institutional capacities. Consid-
er the stories told earlier about Texas,
California, and Pennsylvania (and add
New York to the analysis). Texas made
no changes in capacity in the face of liti-






gation and a consent decree. California’s
Youth Authority reduced its capacity from
ten thousand a decade ago to less than
two thousand today in response to litiga-
tion. Pennsylvania built a juvenile prison
that now houses nearly one thousand
young offenders, but New York State is
attempting to close several of its juvenile
incarceration facilities, and may yet do so
if the Civil Rights Division of the Justice
Department proceeds from its investiga-
tion to pursue litigation. However, New
York’s efforts to downsize its system have
been neutralized by the structure of union
contracts and political constraints from
local legislators fearing adverse economic
impacts from the closing of institutions.
There are 241 empty beds out of about
300 in the six nonsecure residential facili-
ties targeted for closing, and 254 state em-
ployees will lose their jobs if the closings
proceed.76 The math suggests part of the
reason why closing is so hard to achieve. 
The number of minors locked up across
the nation is a small fraction of the adoles-
cents under the supervision of the juvenile
and criminal justice systems, but it casts a
long shadow over the principles and prac-
tice of juvenile and criminal justice. Sep-
arate institutions for juveniles, and later
a separate court, served the twin goals of
protecting adolescent offenders from the
stigma and brutality of criminal justice
and intervening in their lives to remedy
the conditions that animated their antiso-
cial behavior. Yet the punitive turn in ju-
venile justice increased the use of incarcer-
ation by juvenile courts and the expulsion
of juvenile offenders to adult jails and pris-
ons.77 Not only are both forms of juvenile
incarceration plagued by unconstitution-
ally cruel conditions and institutional ne-
glect, but the emphasis on punitiveness,
including the exile of juveniles to the crim-
inal justice system, before adolescent de-
velopment may do more harm than good.
Three facts suggest that the punitive
turn in juvenile corrections is neither a
socially productive nor a principled path.
First, new behavioral and biological re-
search about maturity and criminal cul-
pability, largely focused on emotional
regulation, impulsivity, decision-making,
and other behavioral functioning close-
ly linked to brain development and the
social psychological skills that it con-
trols, suggests that children remain im-
mature and therefore less culpable well
into late adolescence.78 Second, adoles-
cents who are tried and punished as
adults are rearrested and incarcerated
more often, more quickly, and for more
serious crimes.79 They are more likely
to suffer mental health problems, in-
cluding traumatic stress reactions, and
are less likely to receive effective ser-
vices to overcome their developmental
or other behavioral de½cits. And third,
lengthened sentences for juvenile of-
fenders, whether in juvenile or adult 
corrections placements, are of no ap-
parent consequence to public safety.80
These facts argue for a return to the ½rst
principles of juvenile justice: avoiding
harm and stigma and building the social
capital and human capacity of the child.
Declining crime rates, the pervasiveness
of racial disparities in detention and in-
carceration, the intellectual and political
exhaustion of the “toughness” paradigm
in juvenile justice, and new gains in the
science of adolescent development have
converged to create an opportunity for
principled reform. More careful regula-
tion and deliberation of the use of incar-
ceration can lay the foundation for more
effective and fair policies. While the law
has moved toward increasing the incar-
ceration of younger teens, social and bio-
logical evidence suggests moving in the
other direction. Perhaps it is time for the
law to change course and follow the sci-
ence and the principles it evokes.













1 Sharon Dolovich, “Incarceration: American Style,” Harvard Law & Policy Review 3 (2009): 237.
2 Parens patriae is a doctrine commonly associated in both policy and law with the rights and
obligations of the state and courts toward children and incapacitated adults. The diminished
competence and autonomy of children is the court’s justi½cation for invoking parens patriae
to supplant parental authority and assert control over children. See Julian Mack, “The Juve-
nile Court,” Annual Report of the 32nd Conference of the American Bar Association (1909), 451.
3 In Schall v. Martin (467 U.S. 253, 1984), Justice Rehnquist argued that preventive detention
is designed to protect the child and society from the potential consequences of the child’s
own “folly.”
4 Ibid. The court said that the combined interest in protecting both the community and the
juvenile himself from the consequences of future criminal conduct is suf½cient to justify
such detention. The court rejected claims about accuracy of such predictions, stating that
“from a legal point of view, there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of
future criminal conduct” and that a prediction of future criminal conduct is “‘an experi-
enced prediction based on a host of variables’ which cannot be readily codi½ed” (citing
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 16 [1979]).
5 Philip J. Cook and John H. Laub, “The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence,” in
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 24, Youth Violence, ed. Michael Tonry and Mark
H. Moore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 27.
6 Barry C. Feld, Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation of the Juvenile Court (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999); Franklin E. Zimring, American Youth Violence (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998).
7 Paul Lerman, “Twentieth-Century Developments in America’s Institutional Systems for
Youth in Trouble,” in A Century of Juvenile Justice, ed. Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2002).
8 See, for example, Inside Out: Youth Experiences Inside New York’s Juvenile Placement System
(Citizens’ Committee for Children of New York, 2009), http://www.cccnewyork.org/
publications/CCCjuvenilejusticereport2009.pdf.
9 Jeffrey Fagan, “Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving Border Disputes,” Future of
Children 8 (2008): 81.
10 Ibid.
11 William J. Bennett, John J. Dilulio, Jr., and John P. Walters, Body Count: Moral Poverty–and
How to Win America’s War Against Crime and Drugs (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
12 Malcolm W. Klein, The American Street Gang (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995);
Feld, Bad Kids. 
13 Placement data for the years between 1993 and 1997 are not available. Prior to 1993, data
were collected every three years as part of the Children in Custody (cic) census, conducted
by the Of½ce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. It was based on a mail survey
with response rates that varied by year. Starting in 1997, cic was replaced by the Census of
Juveniles in Residential Placement (cjrp), a one-day count conducted by the U.S. Bureau of
the Census of all children placed in public and private facilities. The differences in the two
data sets reflect both the types of facilities included and whether residents are counted based
on the state from which they were committed or, in the newer census, the state where they
were placed. When aggregated to examine national trends, any biases resulting from these
differences are minimized.
14 Melissa Sickmund, Juveniles in Residential Placement, 1997–2008 (Of½ce of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, 2010), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf½les1/
ojjdp/229379.pdf. 






15 The rate for adults is 509 per 100,000 persons in prisons and 762 per 100,000 in prisons or
local jails. Heather C. West and William J. Sabol, Prison Inmates at Mid-Year 2008–Statistical
Tables (Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, 2009), Table 1, http://bjs.ojp
.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf.
16 Sickmund, Juveniles in Residential Placement.
17 Melissa Sickmund et al., Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook (National Cen-
ter for Juvenile Justice, 2008), http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/cjrp/. 
18 These offenses include running away from home, incorrigibility, truancy, curfew violation,
and underage drinking.
19 Howard N. Snyder and Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National
Report (Of½ce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice,
2006), http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/. 
20 See West and Sabol, Prison Inmates at Mid-Year 2008, Table 21.
21 See, for example, Ruth D. Peterson, “Youthful Offenders Designations and Sentencing in
the New York Criminal Courts,” Social Problems 35 (1988): 111–130.
22 Andrea McGowan et al., “Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer
of Juveniles from the Juvenile Justice System to the Adult Justice System: A Report on Rec-
ommendations of the Task Force on Community Preventive Services,” Morbidity and Mor-
tality Weekly Report 56 (RR-9) (November 30, 2007): 1–11; Donna Bishop, “Juvenile Offend-
ers in the Adult Criminal System,” Crime and Justice 27 (2000): 81–167; Fagan, “Juvenile
Crime and Criminal Justice.” But see Steven D. Levitt, “Juvenile Crime and Punishment,”
Journal of Political Economy 106 (1998): 1156. 
23 This separation, however meaningful or substantively vague, was at the heart of the earliest
forms of juvenile justice in the nineteenth century, when separate institutions for youths
were created to shield them from the stigma and exploitation of older convicts. The moti-
vations, though, were not entirely benevolent. The new youth-only institutions were also
accommodations to the growing tendency among judges to avoid harsh punishments by
dismissing criminal cases against older children, setting child offenders free without any
form of social regulation or control. See John Sutton, Stubborn Children: Controlling Delin-
quency in the United States, 1640–1981 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); and
David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). In 1851, in New York, the Children’s Aid Society opened the
House of Refuge for Delinquent Children under twelve, ostensibly to separate the “older”
cohort of juvenile offenders from the very young ones. This division effectively created a
disputed developmental territory between early and later adolescence; reformers used the
territory to contest age-based linkages between vulnerability and culpability and the appro-
priate institutional responses.
24 Martin Forst, Jeffrey Fagan, and T. Scott Vivona, “Youth in Prisons and Training Schools:
Perceptions and Consequences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy,” Juvenile & Family Court
Journal 40 (1989): 1; “The Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to
the Adult Criminal Court,” research brief no. 5 (MacArthur Research Network on Adolescent
Development and Juvenile Justice), http://www.adjj.org/downloads/3582issue_brief_ 5.pdf. 
25 Two recent Supreme Court opinions cited a body of robust social and behavioral science
that demonstrates the diminished culpability of adolescents with respect to regulation of
emotions and impulses, capacity to foresee consequences of their actions, and susceptibili-
ty to peer influences. See Roper v. Simmons (543 U.S. 551 [2005]) and Graham v. Florida (No.
08-7412, 982 So. 2d 43, reversed and remanded [2010]). 
26 Elizabeth S. Scott and Laurence Steinberg, Rethinking Juvenile Justice (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2008).
27 Fagan, “Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice.”






28 Feld, Bad Kids; Zimring, American Youth Violence.
29 See, for example, Patricia Torbet et al., State Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime
(Of½ce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, 1996).
30 Fagan, “Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice”; Donna Bishop, “Juvenile Offenders in the
Adult Criminal System.”
31 Torbet et al., State Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime.
32 See State v. Standard, 569 S.E.2d 325, 329 (2002). In general, see The Rest of Their Lives and
The Rest of Their Lives, 2008 Update (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 2005
and 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11578/section/1 and http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/½les/reports/us1005execsum.pdf. The fact that mandatory life-without-parole sen-
tences require a predicate of transfer, the cumulative disadvantage of poor counsel and
early-stage detention compound the risks for a life-without-parole sentence through dis-
advantages at the early stages of charging and plea bargaining.
33 See Graham v. Florida.
34 See The Rest of Their Lives, 2008 Update; also Cruel and Unusual: Sentencing 13- and 14-Year-
Old Children to Die in Prison (Equal Justice Initiative, 2008), http://eji.org/eji/½les/Cruel
%20and%20Unusual%202008_0.pdf. 
35 Torbet et al., State Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime.
36 See The Connecticut Juvenile Justice Strategic Plan: Building Toward a Better Future (State of Con-
necticut Judicial Branch, 2006), http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/news/JuvenileJustPlan/
CJJ_ExecutiveSummary.pdf. 
37 Fagan, “Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice.” 
38 A few states developed statutes to try juveniles as adults but sentence them to juvenile cor-
rectional institutions. The theory was that the determination of guilt or innocence should
respond to an adult standard of culpability, and that the trial itself was a form of expressive
condemnation for the minor’s offense. However, the reach of these laws was narrow, affect-
ing few youths in a small number of states. Moreover, although the laws did succeed in
shielding juveniles from placements with adults, they were no more than half-measures
with respect to avoiding the stigma of a criminal conviction. See Patricia Torbet et al.,
Juveniles Facing Criminal Sanctions: Three States that Changed the Rules (2000), http://www
.ncjrs.gov/pdf½les1/ojjdp/181203.pdf. 
39 Even California’s controversial Youth Authority has conformed to this trend; for many
years it was an exception. However, the total incarcerated juvenile population declined
from approximately 10,000 in 1996 to 1,568 today. See 2008 Population Report (Division of
Juvenile Justice, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2008), http://
www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/research_tips.html.
40 Bennett, Dilulio, and Walters, Body Count.
41 Cook and Laub, “The Unprecedented Epidemic of Youth Violence.”
42 Zimring, American Youth Violence.
43 “Pennsylvania Opens Nation’s First Youth Prison,” Corrections Digest, December 15, 2000. 
44 See, for example, Jerome G. Miller, Last One Over the Wall: The Massachusetts Experiment in
Closing Reform Schools (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1991).
45 See, for example, Lloyd Ohlin et al., “Radical Correctional Reform: A Case Study of the
Massachusetts Youth Correctional System,” Harvard Educational Review, special issue on
The Rights of Children, 120 (1974).
46 Edmund F. McGarrell, Juvenile Correctional Reform: Two Decades of Policy and Procedural
Change (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).






47 Civ No. 1:07-CA-276 (W.D. Tex.). See also Sylvia Moreno, “In Texas, Scandals Rock Juve-
nile Justice System,” The Washington Post, April 5, 2007.
48 Nicholas Confessore, “Federal Oversight for Troubled N.Y. Youth Prisons,” The New York
Times, July 14, 2010. Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Gover-
nor David A. Paterson, Re: Investigation of the Lansing Residential Center, Louis Gossett,
Jr. Residential Center, Tryon Residential Center, and Tryon Girls Center, August 14, 2009,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/NY_juvenile_facilities_½ndlet_08-14-2009.pdf.
49 Farrell v. Gate, RG03-079344 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2004).
50 See 18 U.S.C. section 3626 (1995).
51 See Michelle Inderbitzin, “Reentry of Emerging Adults: Adolescent Inmates’ Transition Back
Into the Community,” Journal of Adolescent Research 24 (2009): 453. Also see Scott Huey et al.,
“Mechanisms of Change in Multisystemic Therapy: Reducing Delinquent Behavior through
Therapist Adherence and Improved Family and Peer Functioning,” Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology 68 (2000): 451.
52 Michael E. Tigar, “What are We Doing to the Children?: An Essay on Juvenile (In)Justice,”
Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 7 (2010): 849.
53 Robert J. Sampson and Jeffrey Morenoff, “Durable Inequality: Spatial Dynamics, Social
Processes, and the Persistence of Poverty in Chicago Neighborhoods,” in Poverty Traps,
ed. Samuel Bowles, Steven Durlauf, and Karla Hoff (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
2006), 176–203.
54 Sickmund et al., Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook.
55 Juvenile arrest rates for drug offenses are strongly at odds with their involvement in drug
use and drug selling. See, for example, Leonard Saxe et al., “The Visibility of Illicit Drugs:
Implications for Community-Based Drug Control Strategies,” American Journal of Public
Health 91 (2001): 1987.
56 Ibid. See also, Donna M. Bishop, “The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Juvenile Justice Pro-
cessing,” in Our Children, Their Children: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Differences in American
Juvenile Justice, ed. Darnell F. Hawkins and Kimberly Kempf-Leonard (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2005). 
57 George S. Bridges and Sara Steen, “Racial Disparities in Of½cial Assessments of Juvenile
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms,” American Sociological Review
63 (1998): 554; Sandra Graham and Brian S. Lowery, “Priming Unconscious Racial Stereo-
types about Adolescent Offenders,” Law & Human Behavior 28 (2004): 483.
58 Kareem L. Jordan and Tina L. Freiburger, “Examining the Impact of Race and Ethnicity on
the Sentencing of Juveniles in the Adult Court,” Criminal Justice Policy Review 21 (2010): 185.
59 Carl E. Pope, Rick Lovell, and Heidi M. Hsia, Disproportionate Minority Con½nement: A Review
of the Research Literature from 1989 through 2001 (Of½ce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, 2002), http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/dmc/pdf/dmc89
_01.pdf; David Huizinga et al., Disproportionate Minority Contact in the Juvenile Justice System:
A Study of Differential Minority Arrest/Referral to Court in Three Cities (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf½les1/ojjdp/grants/219743.pdf. 
60 Lawrence Bobo and Victor Thompson, “Unfair by Design: The War on Drugs, Race, and
the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System,” Social Research 73 (2006): 445.
61 See, for example, Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., “Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Pro-
cessing,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 87 (2004): 876; Jennifer L. Eberhardt 
et al., “Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts
Capital-Sentencing Outcomes,” Psychological Science 17 (2006): 383.
62 Anthony Greenwald and Linda Hamilton Krieger, “Implicit Bias: Scienti½c Foundations,”
California Law Review 94 (2006): 945. 






63 Eberhardt et al., “Seeing Black.”
64 E. Ashby Plant and B. Michelle Peruche, “The Consequences of Race for Police Of½cers’
Responses to Criminal Suspects,” Psychological Science 16 (2005): 180.
65 Patrick Bayer, Radi Hjalmarsson, and David Pozen, “Building Criminal Capital Behind Bars:
Peer Effects in Juvenile Corrections,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (2009): 105. Bayer
and colleagues show that adolescents placed in correctional institutions are more likely than
those in smaller residential placements to form stronger peer networks with other delin-
quents that lead to higher rearrest rates within two years of release.
66 Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
2006); Todd R. Clear, Imprisoning Communities: How Mass Incarceration Makes Disadvantaged
Neighborhoods Worse (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
67 Robert J. Sampson and John H. Laub, Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning Points through
Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); Jeffrey Fagan and Richard B. Free-
man, “Crime and Work,” Crime and Justice 25 (1999): 113.
68 Fagan and Freeman, “Crime and Work.” Also see Donna M. Bishop, “The Role of Race
and Ethnicity in Juvenile Justice Processing”; Rodney L. Engen, Sara Steen, and George S.
Bridges, “Racial Disparities in the Punishment of Youth: A Theoretical and Empirical As-
sessment of the Literature,” Social Problems 49 (2002): 194; Donna M. Bishop and Charles
E. Frazier, “Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-Making: Findings of a Statewide
Analysis,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 86 (1996): 415.
69 See, for example, Christopher Wildeman, “Parental Imprisonment, the Prison Boom, and
the Concentration of Childhood Disadvantage,” Demography 46 (2009): 265. Also see Bruce
Western and Christopher Wildeman, “The Black Family and Mass Incarceration,” Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 621 (2009): 221.
70 See Act of Nov. 4, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-586, section 2(f)(3)(A)(ii), 106 Stat. 4982, 4993–94
(codi½ed as amended at 42 U.S.C. section 5633 [Supp. iii 2005]).
71 Olatunde C.A. Johnson, “Disparity Rules,” Columbia Law Review 107 (2005): 374.
72 Heather Gerken, “Federalism All the Way Down?” Harvard Law Review (forthcoming).
73 See Jonathan Simon, Governing through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American
Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
74 Sickmund, Juveniles in Residential Placement.
75 Daniel Mears, “Exploring State-Level Variation in Juvenile Incarceration Rates: Symbolic
Threats and Competing Explanations,” The Prison Journal 86 (2006): 470.
76 Matt Schwarzfeld, “Fewer Lock-Ups, Enough Money?” City Limits Weekly, February 25, 2008.
77 In addition to expanding the crime categories that triggered transfer to the criminal court,
many states reduced the minimum age at which offenders could be sentenced by criminal
courts to age ten or younger. In a few states, all barriers to criminal court were removed
down to the age of infancy; Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims. 
78 For a discussion of this evidence, see Roper v. Simmons (543 U.S. 551 [2005]); and Graham v.
Florida (560 U.S. 130 S. Ct. [2010]). See also Scott and Steinberg, Rethinking Juvenile Justice.
79 Andrea McGowan et al., “Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies.”
80 Thomas A. Loughran et al., “Estimating a Dose-Response Relationship between Length of
Stay and Future Recidivism in Serious Juvenile Offenders,” Criminology 47 (2009): 699;
Daniel Nagin, Francis T. Cullen, and Cheryl Lero Johnson, “Imprisonment and Reoffend-
ing,” Crime and Justice 38 (2009): 115; Anthony N. Doob and Cheryl Marie Webster, “Sen-
tence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis,” Crime and Justice 30 (2003): 143;
Emily G. Owens, “More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the Incapacitative Effect of Sentence
Enhancements,” The Journal of Law and Economics 52 (2009): 551.
